Dynamic models in which agents' behavior depends on expectations of future prices or other endogenous variables can have steady states that are stationary equilibria for a wide variety of expectations rules, including rational expectations. When there are multiple steady states, stability is a criterion for selecting among them as predictions of long-run outcomes. The purpose of this paper is to study how sensitive stability is to certain details of the expectations rules, in a simple OLG model with constant government debt that is financed through seigniorage. We compare simple recursive learning rules, learning rules with vanishing gain, and OLS learning, and also relate these to expectational stability. One finding is that two adaptive expectation rules that differ only in whether they use current information can have opposite stability properties.
INTRODUCTION
One usually assumes in formal macroeconomic modeling that expectations are rational. If this hypothesis is to be thought of as a long-run property of the outcome of some learning and updating process [Lucas (1978) , Grandmont (1988) , Sargent (1993) ], then one should also describe the way the agents form their forecasts and eventually reach a rational expectations equilibrium. Rational expectations and adaptive learning can thus be viewed as complementary approaches: rational expectations allows one to identify the steady states, cycles, or other patterns that might be collectively learnable in the long run, and then adaptive learning allows one to test their stability and learnability.
There has thus developed a large literature on stability in macroeconomic models of adaptive learning [see, e.g., Guesnerie and Woodford (1991) , Grandmont (1998) , and Evans and Honkapohja (2000) ]. It is now well understood that stability properties of learning processes are sensitive to the rule uses by agents to form expectations.
1 This paper explores this sensitivity further by comparing various adaptive learning rules in the context of a single discrete-time macroeconomic model.
The model is one of inflation with constant government debt financed through seigniorage, as in Sargent and Wallace (1981) , Marcet and Sargent (1989) , Arifovic (1995) . 2 It is a simple model with a single state variable (inflation π t ), yet it is not trivial because its reduced form is π t = W (π e t+1 , π e t ); that is, the realized inflation factor depends on expectations for two periods.
3 It features both a low-inflation (π L ) and a high-inflation (π H ) steady state, whose stability we compare for the different learning rules.
The value of this exercise is threefold:
(i) Pedagogically, the exercise clarifies the differences between learning rules; in particular, we shed light on the stability of OLS learning in Marcet and Sargent (1989) . Such a comparison is not as clear in the other learning literature because papers typically differ in both the underlying macroeconomic model and the type of learning. (ii) Methodologically, we find that stability can depend crucially on whether agents use current information to form expectations. As in a large class of temporary equilibrium models, a Walrasian mechanism clears markets in each period. The current-period price, necessarily known to agents at the time of trading, can affect demand both through current terms of trade and through expectations. This combination of effects may lead to multiple within-period Walrasian equilibria that would not exist if expectations were fixed. Thus, a common simplifying assumption is that agents ignore current information when forming expectations. Yet, this assumption is not innocuous. (iii) Substantively, we further characterize stability of the steady states in this macroeconomic model of hyperinflation, which is of intrinsic interest. The gist of our results is that π L tends to be stable and π H unstable (as in previous literature) when not too much weight is placed on current information; otherwise the stability properties may be reversed.
Our findings can be understood through the following examples. Suppose that, in period t, agents form expectations π e t+1 of the inflation factor in the next period as a weighted average of the previous inflation expectations π e t and of an observed inflation factor-either π t−1 (lagged information) or π t (current information). That is, either π e t+1 = απ t−1 + (1 − α)π e t or π e t+1 = απ t + (1 − α)π e t . The coefficient α is constant over time, and hence we call these "constant-gain" expectations rules.
The two rules differ only in the timing of the observed inflation used to update expectations, but they lead to different stability properties: Constant-gain We consider also the "diminishing-gain" case, in which the weight α on new information decreases to zero over time. Not surprisingly, stability does not depend on the lag of the information and is the same as in the constant-gain case with lagged information:
Diminishing-gain expectations rules By applying and extending results from Evans and Honkapohja (2000a) , we also show that stability in the diminishing-gain case is characterized by expectational stability. Expectational stability has been used most extensively in stochastic models, but Evans and Honkapohja (2000a) contains results for deterministic models; we apply these directly to the case of current information. With lagged information, the resulting second-order system cannot be transformed to their framework; hence we provide a new proof.
A much-studied learning rule is OLS learning. Consider first the OLS estimate ofπ for the linear model π s =π + s . This estimate is just the unweighted average of past inflation factors, which is an example of a diminishing-gain expectations rule; thus, the timing of information does not affect stability. In Marcet and Sargent (1989) H in which prices are rising, the variance of recent errors is lower than the variance of older errors. This is why the OLS regression puts more weight on recent inflation factors in a neighborhood of π H and the stability of π H is qualitatively the same as for constant-gain expectations rules. In contrast, around the steady state π Lwhich is close to unity and in which prices are nearly constant-the errors have approximately the same variance, and stability is the same as for diminishing-gain expectations rules.
Thus, using the OLS estimate for p s =π p s−1 + s with lagged data, Marcet and Sargent (1989) conclude that π H is unstable. If they had instead assumed that agents used current information, they would have found that π H was stable. If then they had changed to the OLS estimates of the linear model π s =π + s , whose implicit assumptions on errors are perhaps more plausible (and which does not suffer from nonstationarity of the variables), they would have found again that π H was unstable.
The purpose of this paper is not to advocate any one of these learning rules, but rather to compare and understand them. The exercise illustrates that stability can depend on seemingly minor details of the learning rule and hence that it is hard to draw strong conclusions about equilibrium selection via a purely theoretical study of adaptive learning. However, such exercises are useful and can be coupled with empirical or experimental tests, such as Marimon and Sunder (1993) .
MODEL
The underlying economic model is one of inflation with financing of a government debt by seigniorage. Time is discrete, with periods t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}. The expression "for all t" means "for all t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}," and expressions such as "π t →π " mean "lim t→∞ π t =π." R + denotes [0, ∞) and R ++ denotes (0, ∞).
For all t, p t ∈ R ++ is the period-t price level, π t+1 := p t+1 / p t is the period-(t + 1) inflation factor, and m t is the period-t money supply. There is an initial money supply of m −1 , which is augmented in each period t by p t δ to finance a constant real deficit δ > 0. Hence, for all t, m t = m t−1 + p t δ.
The period-(t + 1) inflation factor expected in period t is denoted π e t+1 ; it is a function-called the "expectations rule"-of the history up through and including period t. Although we study rational expectations in Section 4, elsewhere the expectations rules are adaptive in the sense that they are history dependent and are not necessarily correct in equilibrium. They also have the flavor of predicting inflation from past inflation because the inflation factor expected in any period is in the convex hull of previous realized and expected inflation factors. 
Remark 1. For instance, S might be derived from an overlapping generations model in which (a) the only form of savings is to hold money and (b) it is impossible to borrow against earnings in old age. Then, π e t+1 is the expected price of period-(t + 1) consumption relative to period-t consumption; π a is the relative price at which each generation prefers to consume its endowment; and S is equal to the younger generation's Walrasian net supply of period-t consumption, until the noborrowing constraint is binding. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . The assumption π a > 1 holds, for example, if the utility function is monotone and symmetric and the endowment in youth is greater than the endowment in old age. That S is strictly decreasing up to π a holds if consumption in youth and old age are gross substitutes. Assumption 1 is not consistent with the exponential real-balances demand curve S(π ) = ce −aπ introduced by Cagan (1956) , for which the demand for real money balances is always strictly positive.
Given the period-(t − 1) history, the period-t market-clearing condition for p t is that the supply of and demand for money be equal:
(1) FIGURE 1. An illustration of Assumption 1. In an OLG model with two-period households, the inflation factor represents the terms of trade between consumption tomorrow and today, and the demand for real money balances by youth is equal to their net supply of consumption, if positive. The wavy line (solid and dashed) might be the unconstrained net supply by youth as a function of relative prices, and the solid line is the actual supply curve S given that households cannot borrow. 
Proof. We may rewrite π = W (π, π ) as
We apply the implicit function theorem at (1, 0) and at (π a , 0). Thus, there is a neighborhood U of 0 and there are continuously differentiable functions π L and π H defined on U that satisfy the three properties in the proposition, where the signs of the derivatives depend also on ∂ f /∂δ = −1. 
Because S (π a ) < 0 and S(π a ) = 0,
On the other hand,
STABILITY
In The "open set" qualification is not standard in such a definition; however, as long as the difference equation is continuous, the existence of any such initial conditions implies the existence of an open set of such initial conditions. Otherwise, this is a standard definition in mathematics. In economics, this is often called "local instability."
In most cases the reduced form we obtain is autonomous, and we are able to use standard characterizations of stability and instability. Suppose that g t = g for all t and that g is a first-order difference equation; if it is of higher order, then we first rewrite it as a higher-dimensional first-order equation in the usual way. A sufficient condition for stability is that the modulus of each eigenvalue of the Jacobian of g is less than 1. A sufficient condition for instability is that the modulus of one of these eigenvalues is greater than 1.
Remark 3. Our state variables are π t and π e t . In most cases, we derive a reducedform system that involves only {π e t } ∞ t=1 . We study the reduced form because, for π ∈ R ++ , (π,π) is an (un)stable steady state for the system with state variables π t and π e t ifπ is an (un)stable steady state of the reduced-form system. A steady state of the reduced form corresponds to a steady state of the full system because we study expectations rules in which π e t is constant if and only if π t is constant. Instability in the reduced form trivially implies instability of the full system. Stability(a) and stability(b) in the reduced form imply the same for the state variable π t because W is continuous.
Remark 4. The conditions we derive for stability or instability of steady states are in terms of δ, S, and the expectations rule. These conditions are the easiest to state and interpret when δ = 0, and can then be extended (by continuity) to δ in a neighborhood of 0. Thus, each of the results in this section holds only for δ in some neighborhood of 0.
7 For conciseness, we use the notation "for δ ≈ 0, .
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
A price path { p t } ∞ t=0 is said to be a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) if and only if it is an equilibrium for the history-independent expectations rule π
On a suitable domain for π t , we can rewrite (3) as π t+1 = (π t ), where
An inflation path {π t+1 } ∞ t=0 is then a REE inflation path if and only if S(π 1 ) > δ and π t+1 = (π t ) for t ≥ 1.
8
Our reduced form under RE is thus the difference equation π t+1 = (π t ). We apply the usual definition of stability, but its interpretation is no longer "robustness to small perturbations" (which are inconsistent with rational expectations) but rather "indeterminacy": Stability means that, for each neighborhood of the steady state, there is an open set of equilibria (parameterized by π 1 ) for which the path of inflation factors does not leave this neighborhood and converges to the steady state. Proof. We show that (π L ) > 1 and 0 < (π H ) < 1 when δ = 0, and hence (by continuity) when δ ≈ 0. Differentiate (3) to find (·):
CONSTANT-GAIN ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS

Overview
In this section, we consider constant-gain expectations rules, in which inflation expectations π e t+1 are recursively updated each period t by combining (e.g., averaging) the previous expected inflation factor π e t and an observed inflation factor π i t using a time-invariant rule. We say that information is lagged if π
A principal example is the averaging rule
where α ∈ (0, 1]. More generally, we consider rules of the form π
where ψ : R 2 ++ → R ++ is assumed to be continuously differentiable, to put positive weight on new information, and to leave expectations unmodified if the observed inflation equals the previously expected inflation. Denoting the first derivatives of ψ by ψ π i := ∂ψ/∂π i and ψ π e := ∂ψ/∂π e , this assumption can be stated as follows.
Lagged Information
We begin with the case of lagged information: 
whereas π L is unstable for δ ≈ 0 if this inequality is reversed.
Thus, π L is unstable when the supply function is sufficiently steep. A steeper S implies that agents decrease their savings more-and hence current inflation is higher-if they expect inflation to be high.
Current Information
When the expectations rule uses lagged information, there is a single Walrasian equilibrium within each period. This has nothing to do with the assumption that S is downward sloping. Recall that π e t+1 represents the expected terms of trade between period-t and period-(t + 1) consumption. When these terms are fixed, so is the real demand S(π e t+1 ) for money by households. The real supply by the government is always fixed at δ, and the nominal supply m t−1 going into the period is also fixed. The market-clearing price p t is simply that which makes the nominal value of the net real demand for money,
If households instead use current-period information to update their inflation expectations, then a higher price for current consumption raises inflation expectations and hence makes current consumption seem less dear compared to tomorrow's consumption. Hence, demand for current consumption rises and real demand for money falls when p t rises. The effect this has on the nominal demand for money is ambiguous, since the nominal value of a fixed quantity of real demand rises. There can be multiple prices at which the nominal demand and nominal supply of money are equal. ] and thus we can define (in)stability in the usual way. If the equilibrium selection picks out the equilibrium point farthest from π e t , then stability means that there is a neighborhood of the steady state such that, for every initial condition in this neighborhood and every equilibrium path with this initial condition, the inflation factor converges to the steady state. This is rarely satisfied when multiplicity is truly a problem. For example, if there are multiple equilibria at the steady state, then a path starting in the "steady state" can immediately jump away from it. Stability is more likely to be obtained if the equilibrium selection, in a neighborhood of each steady state, instead picks out an equilibrium that is closest to the steady state. Stability then means roughly that there is a neighborhood of the steady state such that, for every initial condition in this neighborhood, there is some equilibrium path with this initial condition that converges to the steady state.
We adopt the latter approach by defining an equilibrium selection F that is obtained, in a neighborhood of each steady state, by applying the implicit function theorem to f (π t , π e t ) = 0. The instability results so derived are robust in the sense that, if π is an unstable steady state for such a selection, then it is also unstable-or perhaps not even a steady state-for other selections. On the other hand, one could take issue with stability if one has given reasons to assume a different selection. This caveat is discussed further following Proposition 5. 
Proof. See Appendix A.
Thus, π
H is stable when expectations are conditioned on current information but is unstable when conditioned on lagged information. The stability of π L can also change. If π L is stable when information is current, it remains stable when information is lagged; however, if (1, 1) , then, for δ ≈ 0, π L is unstable when information is current but is stable when information is lagged.
Van Zandt and Lettau (2001, Sect. 6) show that the implicit equilibrium selection on which this section is based is tatônnement unstable and that, when S is affine, there may be another equilibrium selection that is tatônnement stable and for which π H is not a steady state. 11 If one requires tatônnement stability as a refinement, then π H is eliminated, just as in the lagged-information case. However, the reasons are completely different. The tatônnement argument says that π H is not even a steady state because of a refinement on the static within-period Walrasian equilibria. If this is the justification for ruling out π H rather than dynamic stability, then this argument should be made explicitly. Note that stability of π L cannot be restored under current information by invoking this refinement.
EXPECTATIONAL STABILITY AND SLOW UPDATING
We examine recursive time-independent rules that put low weight on the last observation and time-dependent rules for which the weight on the last observation diminishes to zero.
Updating with Constant but Low Weight on New Information
Recall the expectations rules π e t+1 = ψ(π i t , π e t ) studied in Section 5. Intuitively, if little weight is placed on the last observation (ψ π i is small), then stability should not depend on whether lagged or current information is used. For the low-inflation steady state π L , this is easy to see from Propositions 4 and 5: When ψ π i ≈ 0, the inequality in equation (6) holds and the inequality in equation (7) is reversed; hence π L is stable whether information is lagged or current. However, Proposition 5 does not tell us whether π H is unstable when information is current but little weight is placed on new information. This proposition states that π H is stable for δ ≈ 0 when information is current; the meaning of this result is that, for fixed ψ, there is aδ > 0 such that π H is stable for δ <δ. An inspection of the proof of Proposition 5 reveals it is also true that, for fixed δ > 0, there is anᾱ such that π H is unstable if
We can also reach these conclusions by using the criterion of expectational stability, introduced by Evans (1985) and used extensively to characterize asymptotic stability in stochastic systems with decreasing-gain learning rules [see Evans and Honkapohja (2000b) for an overview]. In our model, a steady state is expectationally (un)stable if it is an (un)stable zero of the following differential equation:
That is,π is expectationally stable if
and it is expectationally unstable if this inequality is reversed. Proof. According to Remark 3, Proof. See Appendix B.
Diminishing Gains
It is also intuitive that ifπ is (un)stable for ψ π i close to zero, then it should be (un)stable when the adjustment of expectations is time dependent and converges to zero, as in the expectations rule
where π i t is equal to either π t−1 or π t and where α t → 0. A caveat is that the sequence {α t } should not converge so quickly that the system gets stuck at a nonsteady state. This is the gist of Propositions 8 and 9 below. These results are similar to the use of expectational stability to characterize stability in stochastic systems with diminishing updating of expectations. Evans and Honkapohja (2000a) give results for deterministic models that we adapt to ours when π i t = π t (Proposition 8). When instead π i t = π t−1 , our model does not fit their framework. Therefore, we provide an independent proof, Proposition 9. We begin by specifying the parts of the model and the assumptions that are common to the two propositions. Proof. See Appendix B.
PROPOSITION 9. Consider Assumption 3 with lagged information, and letπ be a steady state. If {α t } is weakly decreasing, thenπ is stable if it is expectationally stable. If W 2 (π,π) < 0, thenπ is unstable if it is expectationally unstable.
Proof. See Appendix B. Marcet and Sargent (1989) study the dynamics of this model for the case of affine S, using an expectations rule in which π e t+1 is the OLS estimate ofπ for the model
OLS LEARNING REVISITED
using price data only up through period t − 1. In our notation, we can write this expectations rule, which we call "OLS 
using price data up through period t − 1 in one case and period t in the other. We refer to these rules as "OLS π t−1 " and "OLS π t ," respectively. Of course, these OLS estimates are just the means of the inflation factors in the data sets, Consider first OLS π t−1 and OLS π t , for which the α t are history-independent, sum to ∞, and converge to 0 (this case was studied in Section 6). According to Propositions 8 and 9, a steady stateπ is asymptotically (un) 
Given the OLS assumption that the disturbances { s } ∞ s=2 are i.i.d., the difference between models (11) and (10) is that the former views the variance of the disturbances to the inflation rates as inversely proportional to the square of the previous period's price level. Hence, if prices are rising, OLS p t−1 and OLS p t put more weight on recent than on older observations of inflation. If the inflation factor is above and bounded away from 1, then α t is bounded away from 0. In particular, if π t →π ≥ 1 then α t → 1 −π −2 =: απ .
12
Consider a steady state π ∈ {π L , π H }. As long asπ > 1, so that απ > 0, intuitively the stability of the steady state should be the same as for the constant-gain expectations rule 
CONCLUSION
Both active researchers in and observers of the literature on stability under adaptive learning in macroeconomic models are aware that changes in expectations rules affect the stability of steady states. Such nonrobustness is a fact of life when rationality and fulfilled expectations, whose specification is typically derived from deductive principles, are replaced by realistic models of boundedly rational behavior, the choice of which is essentially an empirical question. The indeterminacy that arises in models of rational expectations (or, e.g., of equilibria in games) is replaced by indeterminacy about the proper specification of expectations (or, e.g., of reputation or learning in games). Yet the development of such models helps us to understand how various kinds of human behavior lead to different outcomes. Thus, the main results of this paper (outlined in the Introduction) are not intended to uncover a smoking gun of nonrobust models. Rather, the exercise provides concrete examples of nonrobustness in order to help us understand what factors affect stability. In particular, we show that the assumption that agents use lagged rather than current information should not be made casually and should not be justified solely by the simplification that such an assumption allows.
We also found this exercise useful for understanding the existing literature because we were able to experiment with a variety of learning rules-similar to ones that have been used in this literature-in the context of a single simple macroeconomic model. We hope that some readers also benefit in this way.
NOTES
1. See Guesnerie and Woodford (1992, Sect. 7) for an overview of different learning criteria for selecting equilibria.
2. It is similar to the continuous-time hyperinflation model of, e.g., Cagan (1956) , Sargent and Wallace (1987) , and Bruno and Fischer (1990) . See Van Zandt and Lettau (2001, Sect. 10 ) for a comparison of the discrete-time and continuous-time models.
3. In contrast, many general treatments of stability, such as Woodford (1991, 1992) , study the reduced form
4. There are other ways to form expectations. Van Zandt and Lettau (2001) considers also, for the case of no government debt, (a) predicting prices as an average of past prices, as in Fuchs and Laroque (1976), Tillman (1983) , and Lucas (1986) ; and (b) estimating a trend in inflation factors, as in Duffy (1994) .
5. Given in Van Zandt and Lettau (2001, Sect. 2) . 6. S (π a ) is only the left derivative of S at π a . For the application of the implicit function theorem at (π a , 0), we thus use the following fact: Assumption 1 implies that there is a continuously differentiable functionŜ that coincides with S on [0, π a ] and for whichŜ (π a ) = S (π a ). We replace S byŜ in order to apply the implicit function theorem, and then observe that for, δ ≥ 0, the implicitly defined function only takes values in the range [0, π a ] whereŜ = S.
7. This is not a mere technical simplification; for example, Bullard (1994) shows that dynamics in a least-squares learning model similar to Marcet and Sargent (1989) (but with constant nominal deficit) becomes quite complicated for larger values of δ.
8. This claim is stated and proved precisely in Van Zandt and Lettau (2001, Sect. 4) , where the domain of is also defined. 9. We first studied the basic ideas of this section via an example that is now in Van Zandt and Lettau (2001) . This example was also studied independently and contemporaneously by Virasoro (1994) .
10. With multiple goods, there can be multiple equilibria even with lagged information, and hence current information does not introduce additional complications. This is why the literature on temporary equilibrium with multiple goods typically assumes that agents use current information and adopts the approach to equilibrium selection outlined later [e.g., see Grandmont (1998) ]. Lagged information arose as a simplifying assumption in single-good macroeconomic models, such as that of Marcet and Sargent (1989) .
11. We are greatly indebted to Albert Marcet for bringing this fact to our attention. The views expressed here are those of the authors.
12. A proof of this formula for the limit is in Marcet and Sargent (1989 
APPENDIX A: PROOFS FOR CONSTANT-GAIN RECURSIVE EXPECTATIONS
For future reference, we note the standard conditions for stability of a second-order homogeneous difference equation [Gandolfo (1997, p. 58 be the partial derivates of g. Evaluated at a steady state,
Consider first the steady state π H . By Assumption 2, ψ π i is bounded away from zero; by Remark 2, lim δ↓0
> 2 and π H is unstable. Now, consider π L . We evaluate the stability conditions in Lemma A.1 in the limit as δ = 0; by continuity the conclusions hold for δ ≈ 0. Note from equation (2) that, at π = π L and when δ = 0, W 1 = −W 2 . Hence, the stability conditions become ψ π i W 1 < 0 and |ψ π i W 1 + ψ π e | < 1 + ψ π i W 1 . Because ψ π i W 1 > 0 and 0 ≤ ψ π e < 1, the second condition holds. The condition
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof begins with the discussion of equilibrium selections that precedes Proposition 5. Recall that the period-t equilibrium condition is
We let F be an equilibrium selection that, in a neighborhood of the steady states π L and π H , selects the equilibrium closest to the steady state. Then F is defined in a neighborhood of each of these steady states by application of the implicit function theorem, when possible. The dynamic system thus becomes π t = F(π e t ) and π e t+1 = ψ(π t , π e t ) for t ≥ 2. Combining these, we obtain a single equation π . Letπ be a steady state and let f π and f π e denote the partial derivatives of f . In what follows, partial derivatives are evaluated at π t = π e t =π , and their arguments are omitted for clarity. We thus have
As long as f π = 0, there is a neighborhood ofπ on which F coincides with a function obtained by applying the implicit function theorem to f (π t , π e t ) = 0 at π t = π e t =π. It follows that F is differentiable atπ and that F (π) = − f π e / f π . Hence, g is differentiable atπ and
Into the right-hand side, we substitute the expressions (for W 1 and W 2 ) found in Remark 2, and so obtain
Thus,π is a stable steady state of g if |g (π)| < 1 and is unstable if |g (π)| > 1. If f π = 0 and f π e = 0, then for π e t close toπ , there are no solutions to f (π, π e t ) = 0 as close as π e t tô π; henceπ is unstable.
Consider the steady state π 
Thus, inequality (A.4) is a sufficient condition for instability of π L when δ = 0 and, by continuity of the derivatives, for δ ≈ 0. Substituting ψ π e = 1 − ψ π i and rearranging yields the inequality in equation (7) 
The dynamic system governing π e t in a neighborhood ofπ is π
and g (π) > 0 for ψ π i ≈ 0. We also have g (π) < 1 (henceπ is stable) if
This holds ifπ is expectationally stable and hence 1 − W 1 − W 2 > 0. Similarly, ifπ is expectationally unstable, then g (π) > 1 andπ is unstable.
Proof of Proposition 8. Evans and Honkapohja (2000a) study a (multidimensional) system of the form
where the sequence {α t } satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 8 and F satisfies certain assumptions to be described shortly. Our system can be written in this form when π i t = π t and when F is an equilibrium selection-that is, F(π e ; α) is a solution π to
for any π e ∈ A and α ∈ [0, 1). We now explain how to apply their results. Observe that f is continuously differentiable, even for negative α, as long as απ
Hence, since A is open, for any steady stateπ there is a neighborhood of (π,π, 0) in A × A × R on which f is continuously differentiable, and
By the implicit function theorem, we can choose an equilibrium selection F that is continuously differentiable in a neighborhood U of (π, 0), with
Furthermore, we can choose F so that F(π, α) =π for α such that (π, α) ∈ U .
There may be finitely many periods t such that (π, α t ) is not in U . For such t, we note that
By assumption, f π (π,π, α t ) = 0. Hence, we can invoke the implicit function theorem for each of these periods to choose F so that (a) F(π, α t ) =π, (b) F is continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of (π, α t ), and (c)
Evans and Honkapohja (2000a) assume that (a) F is continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of (π, 0) and (b) for all t, F(π, α t ) =π and F is continuous in a neighborhood of (π, α t ). We have shown that these conditions are satisfied.
Their Proposition 1 states thatπ is stable(b) (see Definition 2) if F π e (π; 0) < 1; since F π e (π ; 0) = W 1 (π,π) + W 2 (π,π), this condition is equivalent to expectational stability. An inspection of their proof indicates that they have also shown thatπ is stable, rather than merely stable(b).
Their Proposition 2 states thatπ is unstable if F π e (π, 0) > 1 (i.e., ifπ is expectationally unstable) and if F π e (π, α t ) = −(1 − α t )/α t for all t. The latter condition is
which we assumed for the instability result.
The following lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 9, and is proved in Van Zandt and Lettau (2001, Sect. 9 
Proof of Proposition 9. Consider now the case of lagged information, π 
where W 1 and W 2 are evaluated at (π,π). In the proofs by Evans and Honkapohja (2000a) , it is important that M t can be written M t = I + α t J , where I is the identity matrix and J is a time-invariant matrix. This is not possible here, and so, we provide our own proof. As usual, the main arguments of the proof concern the linear approximation, and then additional arguments show that the residual does not alter the conclusions. Denote the residual of the linearization of W around (π,π) by r . Then, We will choose k below; is then selected accordingly and U denotes the -ball aroundπ.
Stability. We write the difference equation (B.1) as a two-dimensional first-order difference equation, linearized and with a substitution of variables so that the steady state is (0, 0): 
Choose k small enough that K < ρ. Suppose t ≥ τ and π e t , π e t−1 ∈ U . Then,
Note that therefore ζ t+1 < ζ t . Iterating this inequality yields Since ρ − K > 0, Lemma B.1 shows that lim s→∞ ζ τ +s = (0, 0), and hence lim s→∞ θ τ +s = (0, 0).
To conclude, we need to account for what might happen in the first τ periods. Fix any neighborhood U ⊂ U ofπ. We show that there is a neighborhood ofπ such that, for initial conditions in this neighborhood, π e t , π e t+1 ∈ U for t = 1, . . . , τ . It then follows from the above that π e t , π e t+1 ∈ U for t ≥ τ and that π e t →π. [Furthermore, ψ τ +s decreases monotonically and so stability(a) is satisfied.] Hence,π is a stable steady state. This final step follows in the usual way from the local continuity of G t . Specifically, let U τ := U . For t ∈ 1, . . . , τ − 1, given U t+1 , let U t ⊂ U be a neighborhood ofπ such that G(U t × U t ) ⊂ U t+1 × U t+1 ; such a neighborhood exists because G t is continuous in a neighborhood of (π,π) and G t (π,π) = (π,π) . If π e 1 , π e 2 ∈ U 1 then π e t , π e t+1 ∈ U t for t = 1, . . . , τ .
To conclude the proof for stability (and before proceeding to the proof for instability), we provide the proof of the two lemmas. (1 + α s K ).
Then Lemma B.1 shows that lim t→∞ |π e s | = ∞; hence {π e t } must leave U .
APPENDIX C: PROOFS FOR OLS LEARNING
Proof of Proposition 10. For OLS π t−1 and OLS πt , see the paragraph (following the proposition) in which these results are derived as corollaries to Propositions 8 and 9.
OLS p t−1 : Marcet and Sargent (1989) prove these stability results for the case of affine S in their Proposition 3. Since the stability properties are obtained, in any case, by studying a linear approximation of a difference equation, the extension to nonlinear S is trivial (we omit the details). Note that the condition k ≤ 1 in Marcet and Sargent (1989, Proposition 3) holds for δ ≈ 0. 
